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DR. MARTINEAU'S PHILOSOPHY. A SURVEY. By Charles B. Upton, B. A., B. Sc. Emeritus Professor of Philosophy in Manchester College, Oxford. London: James Nisbet & Co., 1905.

If, as Hegel suggests, attempts to interpret a writer are the marks of his greatness, James Martineau has no need of further witnesses. Among his many interpreters none speaks with greater authority than Professor Upton. One of his pupils, he has also been a life-long student of his works, and has further been able to correct and extend the impression of his master's teaching by frequent familiar conversations. The result is a condensed account of his opinions written from the inside which never flags in interest and impresses the reader with a vivid sense of reality. Prefixed to the more biographical and expository chapters is an Introductory Essay on the relations of Dr. Martineau's writings to present views on the Philosophy of Religion. In this the aim is to show that in spite of the defection of some idealist Professors of whom Dr. Martineau himself had hoped better things, the central ideas of his philosophy have found a powerful echo in leading present day writers, both in Oxford and Cambridge, and further, that his theory of the relations of will and force, notwithstanding the different interpretation which another pupil—Principal Carpenter—has recently put upon his words, never changed, and in the form in which he consistently held it is not incompatible with newer physical conceptions. This latter contention receives somewhat hasty treatment and we think will prove unconvincing to those who have followed with any attention recent discussions on the relation between human volition and physical energy. The first chapter tells the story of Martineau's exodus from the Houndsditch of Hartleyan philosophy. The saying that one never knows a thing till one has had to teach it is illustrated in his case. It was in the attempt to expound the theory

317 n 4, in the fourth line from the end, part of the sentence is omitted and a portion of another from the third line above is substituted. On the title page the author is said to be "Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in Cornell University, and Director of the American School of Archæology in Jerusalem." The name of the latter institution is not "The American School of Archæology in Jerusalem," but "The American School of Oriental Study and Research in Palestine." Moreover, Professor Schmidt was its Director only for the year 1904-1905. In using the title this fact should have been stated. To insert it, without the date, in a book which is to circulate for years is misleading.

in College lectures that the poverty of its leading hypotheses dawned upon him. The liberation of his mind from the cramping influence of its mechanical necessitarianism was completed by his study of Cousin and Channing. Professor Upton has done well in quoting the words in which Martineau records the sense of relief with which he escaped from his "logical cage into the open air." The passage may take its rank beside the somewhat similar confession in Mills' Autobiography. From this time (1839) we are told "his philosophical teaching remained substantially unaltered and self-consistent" a fact it is necessary constantly to bear in mind in estimating the work of the nonagenarian philosopher. The succeeding chapters are devoted to the development of his thought in Lectures, Reviews and Correspondence, Studies in Berlin, and Discussions of the Metaphysical Society. Thereon follow the two main chapters of the book containing an analysis of Martineau's two chief works, the "Types of Ethical Theory" and "The Study of Religion," with the aim of setting in their proper focus the two fundamental ideas which he regarded as the Urim and the Thummim of his ethical and religious philosophy, the freedom of the will and the existence without us of a Divine Mind with which in virtue of our freedom we can put ourselves in understanding communion. For a lucid account of the evidence in which these ideas rested and the spirit in which they were applied in the solution of ethical and religious problems the reader, who is not already familiar with the main lines of Martineau's philosophy, cannot commit himself to better guidance than these chapters supply. Chapter VIII under the title of the "Study of Spinoza" is a closer account of Martineau's relation to various forms of Pantheism and the determinism which they involve. The book ends with a chapter all too short on Appreciations and Criticisms.

While he has here given us a lucid and sympathetic interpretation of his master's opinions, Professor Upton has shown himself no blind disciple and it is interesting to inquire how far in his view we are to attribute stability to the results achieved. Martineau's place in the world of religious literature is fortunately assured beyond all dispute, but he is a metaphysician as well as a seer, and we need not be surprised if his metaphysics fail to satisfy to the same degree as his devotional writings. Many, even during his own life time, noted the curious contrast between the formal philosophy and the religious teaching of one who "thought

like a Socinian and prayed like a Pietist." In the former there was from the first and remained to the last a deistic element that was proper enough in the successor of Priestley and Price, but was curiously foreign to the religious spirit of both an earlier and a later period. At the same time it would have been strange if one so sensitive to intellectual movements had made no attempt to bring his philosophical conclusions into harmony with the influences that moulded the thought of his own century. Hence we have flowing side by side with each other in his writings two currents, one which makes for dualism in metaphysics, individualism in ethics, deism in religion; another which subordinates all these to the spiritual view of man's relation to God and the world, and of the parts of the world to one another, to which his own ethical nature leaned—making it possible for his critics to say of his Philosophy what Mandeville says of his Hive, that "every part was full of vice, yet the whole was a paradise." All this Professor Upton is prepared to acknowledge. He makes it clear that in his view, as contrasted with an inferential theism such as that with which Martineau starts, no position is tenable as the basis of a sound ethical and religious philosophy which does not provide for an immediate apprehension of the divine. He himself finds such a basis with Cousin in the necessity of presupposing as the foundation of the unity of subject and object in our consciousness "a superior absolute unity which contains and explains them." But he is forced to admit that, with the exception of isolated statements, there is nothing to show that this was at all clear to Martineau, or that he was prepared to face the complete reconstruction of his system that it would have involved. It will be of great interest to hear, as we hope we shall in an independent work from Professor Upton, what form the reconstruction in his view ought to take. One thing is likely to become clear in the course of such a restatement. It is hardly likely that so fundamental a change in one of the two leading ideas of Martineau's philosophy can be carried out without affecting the other. That Professor Upton is at present unconscious of any such possibility appears from the running fire of criticism with which he assails any view of the freedom of the will which is not in strict accordance with that which Martineau held. We agree with him that it is too early to assume, as some idealists have done, that controversy as to the existence of an indeterminate element in choice is virtually at an end. But to admit this is one thing, to maintain indeterminate

freedom on the ground that without it moral responsibility and religion in the true sense of the word are impossible is quite another. This view seemed forced upon Martineau both by what he denied and what he accepted in the philosophy of his predecessors. But many things have happened since then. Owing to the growth of psychology we have become familiar with the difference between mechanical and psychological causation and are prepared to admit that actions may be intelligible though not mechanically necessary. Owing to the growth of Monism, religious philosophy has substituted for the older deism a theory of immanence which identifies the inward essence of the human soul with the divine and interprets progress as the development of the God-like in ourselves. In this altered venue it becomes impossible to assign the same paramount importance to the question of the formal freedom of the will. The important thing is to realize in the first place the possibility of determination by ideas and purposes as the characteristic of mind and will, and secondly, determination of the widest and deepest ideas of which we are capable (freedom from the casual and accidentally insistent) as the end of all moral progress. The emphasis has shifted from the form to the content of volition. Whatever truth there may be in libertarianism, the freedom for which it contends is from such a point of view, only at best a moment in a process which acquires its value from the end that is reached, not from any of the parts into which it may be analyzed. Whether when libertarians realize this they will still consider it necessary to have recourse to a conception so remote from all analogy as that of a will, or an element in will, which defies all relation, whether to natural impulse or to formed character, and is wholly indeterminate, remains to be seen. Meantime it is interesting to notice in support of the present contention that while there are still libertarians and determinists, as in Martineau's time, the wheel has come full circle, and things are no longer as they were. The determinist rejects the freedom of the will as incompatible with moral responsibility and any true theory of punishment, while the libertarian supports it in the interest of a form of pluralism which is the very antithesis of the theory of God and of duty for which Dr. Martineau took so courageous a stand.

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